This paper is concerned with the question of how to define the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a finite sequence of exogenously specified TU-games. Three different core concepts are presented: the classical core, the strong sequential core and the weak sequential core. The differences between the concepts arise from different interpretations of profitable deviations by coalitions. Sufficient conditions are given for nonemptiness of the classical core in general and of the weak sequential core for the case of two players. Simplifying characterizations of the weak and strong sequential core are provided. Examples highlight the essential difference between these core concepts.
Introduction
The canonical representation of a cooperative game, the characteristic function, describes the payoffs available to each coalition of players. The simplest and most common interpretation of such a game is that it pertains to a single interaction among the players. However, many, if not most, cooperative endeavors occur more than once or even repeatedly over time.
A few papers have begun to lay the foundation for a theory of cooperative games played in dynamic settings, or dynamic cooperative games. The effort to develop a general theory of such games is complicated by the fact that various new issues arise in a dynamic context, and each may require a somewhat different treatment. In particular, whereas a standard, static, game specifies the set of players and the characteristic function, in a dynamic setting the population of players might change over time, or, given the set of players, the characteristic function might change either as a result of exogenous or endogenous forces.
a Typically, a solution to a dynamic game will exploit intertemporal linkages rather than simply apply a standard solution at each point in time. Moreover, the game itself may depend on the solution at each stage.
Rather than attempt to develop a single, overarching framework that would encompass all possibilities, the strategy adopted in this paper is to present a particular class of dynamic cooperative games and to focus on the extension of a particular solution concept, namely, the core. However, in contrast to static games it is not obvious how to define the core in a dynamic setting. Specifically, there are various ways in which one might formulate the notion of a "profitable deviation." Here we explore three different interpretations, each of which gives rise to a different notion of the core. After introducing the alternative core concepts, we investigate conditions ensuring their nonemptiness, and we consider the relationship between the various concepts.
Before discussing the core concepts, we briefly describe some of the key elements of a dynamic cooperative game. First, we will abstract from changes in the player set. Instead, our focus will be on finite horizon games in which at every stage the same players face an exogenously specified cooperative game with transferable utility. Typically, a solution to the dynamic model will specify a stream of payoffs for each player. This might involve exactly solving each stage game or, if it is possible to trade or transfer payoffs across periods, then it may be possible to relax the instantaneous resource constraints. In either case, it is essential that players have the means to evaluate payoffs at different points in time. Hence, included in the specification of a dynamic game will be the players' intertemporal preferences or utility.
Another important aspect of dynamic games is that the (stage) game and/or solution at any point in time might depend on the history of play up to that point, that is, they may be subject to endogenous influences. This was the subject of a recent paper by Filar and Petrosjan (2000) , who considered dynamic cooperative games where each stage game may depend on the payoffs obtained in earlier periods. The focus of their study was on the issue of "time consistency" of solutions to the stage games.
b However, as mentioned above, here we abstract from endogenous influences and take the sequence of stage games to be given.
In addition to the papers cited above, various authors have addressed these or related issues often in the context of economic examples. For instance, Gale (1978) , Becker and Chakrabarty (1995) , and Koutsogeras (1998) considered core concepts for certain intertemporal economies. Predtetchinsky et al. (2002) considered both time and uncertainty in their study of the core of two-period economies a Rosenthal (1990a Rosenthal ( ,1990b considered the possibility of changing the player set over time, while keeping the worths of the original coalitions fixed. His study focuses on the monotonicity of solutions, that is, whether all of the original players gain with the inclusion of additional players. b Strotz (1955) .
with incomplete information. Finally, Munro (1979) considered Nash bargaining and the core in a dynamic model of optimal resource management.
Turning back to the definition of the core, intuitively, in this context the core should capture those situations in which at each stage the grand coalition is formed, its worth is distributed among the players and no coalition has a profitable deviation. But in determining a profitable deviation, should coalitions be required to deviate at the start of the game and for all time, or can they deviate at a later stage? Should such a deviation itself be stable or are unstable deviations also to be considered? The three concepts we discuss provide different answers to these questions.
The first concept, termed the classical core, assumes that coalitions planning to split off, do so from the beginning. It is not possible, therefore, for coalitions to separate from the grand coalition after having cooperated during the first stages. The classical core may thus be viewed as a static concept since it does not really depend on the time structure in the game. This is reflected by the fact that the classical core coincides with the core of an induced static cooperative game with nontransferable utility.
In the strong sequential core coalitions are allowed to deviate at any stage of the game, but having done so in one period, they must do so in all remaining stages as well. The papers by Gale (1978) and Becker and Chakrabarti (1995) , mentioned above, present similar core concepts for the special case of a monetary economy and a capital accumulation model, respectively. Also Koutsougeras (1998) presents a core concept in this spirit in a two-period economy with asset markets and differential information. For two-period economies with uncertainty and possibly asset markets, Predtetchinsky et al. (2002) study the strong sequential core.
In both the classical and strong sequential cores, deviations are not required to be stable. In other words, a coalition can deviate from the grand coalition and propose a distribution of its worth at each stage which, in turn, could be blocked by some subcoalition in the future. It is known that for static cooperative games this difference is inessential (Ray, 1989) , since allowing only "credible" deviations (i.e., deviations which cannot be blocked by any subcoalition) does not enlarge the set of core allocations. In a dynamic setup, however, the focus on credible deviations does have an impact on the core concept. Payoff streams which distribute the worth of the grand coalition at every stage are said to be in the weak sequential core if they are robust against all credible deviations. Clearly, the strong sequential core is contained in both the classical core and the weak sequential core. It is shown by an example that there is no such logical relationship between the classical and weak sequential core: both cores may be nonempty but have an empty intersection.
With these different core concepts in hand, we then turn to two important issues. Can we find conditions on the stage games and the players' preferences which guarantee a nonempty core? And, is there an easy way to characterize core allocations, at least in some special cases? The last question is especially relevant for the weak sequential core, since its recursive definition of credible deviations makes it somewhat hard to handle.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Sec. 2 we provide basic definitions. Section 3 introduces the classical core concept and provides sufficient conditions on the stage games and preferences to ensure its nonemptiness. In brief, balancedness of the stage games together with quasiconcavity of preferences guarantee that the classical core is nonempty. An example shows that this condition is not necessary. In Sec. 4 we first describe the strong and weak sequential core concepts; we provide a characterization of weak sequential core allocations -which is used to prove an existence result for the two-player case -and we illustrate the concepts by examples. In the last part of this section, we investigate the different core concepts for two special preference classes: symmetric linear preferences and lexicographic preferences. Section 5 contains brief concluding remarks.
Preliminaries
In this section we provide preliminary definitions as well as some well known facts about the core. In addition we define the notion of a dynamic transferable utility game.
TU-games
A game with transferable utility or briefly a TU-game is a pair (N, v) , where N := {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players and v: 2 N → R + assigns to each coalition S ⊆ N c its nonnegative worth v(S), with the convention that v(∅) = 0, and such that v(S) > 0 for at least one coalition S. Usually we simply write v instead of (N, v) . The central question in a TU-game is how to distribute the worth v(S) among the members of S if the coalition is formed. Such a distribution is also called a (payoff ) allocation. For convenience we consider only nonnegative games, but allocations, in general, may contain negative components. The core of a TU-game v is the set
where x(S) denotes the sum i∈S x i . A collection of coalitions B ⊆ 2 N \{∅} is balanced if there are positive real numbers λ S for every S ∈ B such that S∈B:i∈S
According to the well known result of Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) , a TU-game has a nonempty core if and only if it is balanced.
NTU-games
A game without transferable utility or briefly an NTU-game is a pair (N, V ) where V (S) ⊆ R N for each coalition S, and V (∅) = ∅. Usually we write V instead of c The symbol ⊆ means 'inclusion' and the symbol ⊂ means 'strict inclusion'. Vector inequalities are denoted ≥, >, and ≤, <.
(N, V ). Often the following additional conditions are imposed on an NTU-game V :
The core of an NTU-game V , denoted by C(V ), is the set
and is balanced, then it has a nonempty core (see also Kannai, 1992) .
Dynamic TU-games
Let T be a natural number and
be a sequence of TU-games with the same set of players. Let u = (u i ) i∈N be a profile of utility functions for the players. Here, u i : R T → R is a function assigning to every payoff stream
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we assume that the utility functions u i are continuous and strictly increasing in each coordinate, and that each u i is time separable (Koopmans, 1960 
if and only if
In words, the evaluation of future allocation streams does not depend on the history up to that point. Time separability will enable us to define utility functions from any moment t = 1, . . . , T on, independent of the preceding allocation stream (see Sec. 4.1). Not all of these assumptions are needed for every result in the sequel. The assumption of time separability will be needed when we discuss the weak and strong sequential cores in Sec. 4.
One simple way to interpret the utility function u i is to think of the payoffs in a static TU-game as money: then u i represents the evaluation of streams of money. Alternative interpretations are possible, depending on the situation. E.g., utility might be additive -possibly with discounting -over time.
The pair Γ = (v, u) is called a dynamic TU-game. A feasible allocation stream for a coalition S in Γ is a sequence
(Note that bold-face symbols denote time indexed vectors.) For S = N , we omit the 'N ' and write y rather than y N . Let Z Γ (S) denote the set of feasible allocation streams for S in Γ. Also, for y S ∈ Z Γ (S), we write u(y S ) in place of (u i (y i )) i∈S .
For a dynamic TU-game Γ = (v, u) and a nonempty coalition S, we define the set V Γ (S) by
With V Γ (∅) := ∅, the pair (N, V Γ ) is an NTU-game satisfying conditions (N.1), (N.2) and (N.3). We refer to V Γ as the NTU-game associated with Γ. V Γ represents the situation where coalitions cooperate in every stage of the game.
The Classical Core
The classical core of a dynamic TU-game
consists of those allocation streams that generate utility profiles in the core of the associated NTU-game V Γ , that is,
In this section we investigate conditions under which the classical core is non-empty. Here, the specific time structure does not play a role, and all results would obviously hold without the assumption of time separability.
d
In our first result we establish directly that the classical core is nonempty provided the core of each stage game is nonempty as well. The proof associates a dynamic TU-game with an intertemporal exchange economy in which the worth of the grand coalition must be allocated in each period. Nonemptiness of the classical core follows from the existence of a competitive equilibrium in such a context. It is interesting to note that, whereas the core of an exchange economy results from an application of game theory to economics, here we solve a game theoretic problem by employing tools from economics. Theorem 1. Let Γ = (v, u) be a dynamic TU-game satisfying:
Proof. First, we construct an artificial "exchange economy" in which the vector
is to be allocated among the n agents, and the preferences of the agents are represented by their respective utility functions u i (y i ). We then identify a suitable "initial allocation," and show that a "competitive equilibrium" from the initial allocation is in C(Γ). Specifically, we claim that any By way of contradiction, suppose y * / ∈ C(Γ). Then there exists S ⊆ N and some y S ∈ Z Γ (S) such that u i (y i ) > u i (y * i ) for all i ∈ S, and i∈S y i = v(S). Since the utility functions are strictly increasing, it must be the case that for all
, which is a contradiction.
Our second existence result is slightly more general. We establish that under the same conditions as in Theorem 1 the NTU-game associated with Γ is balanced. Nonemptiness of the core then follows by the result of Scarf (1967) since this NTUgame satisfies conditions (N1)-(N3).
Theorem 2. Let Γ = (v, u) be a dynamic TU-game satisfying:
Proof. Let B be a balanced collection with weights λ S for every S ∈ B. Let
where the inequality follows from balancedness (Bondareva-Shapley) of the TU-games v t . This shows that Y is feasible for the grand coalition and, hence,
The following example illustrates that, while it is sufficient that the stage games have nonempty cores, this is by no means necessary for the dynamic game to have a nonempty core. 2, and Γ = (v, u) .
e Then C(Γ) = ∅ and it is given by
The fact that in Example 1 and in many other examples (see below) the classical core of the dynamic game is nonempty in spite of the fact that the stage TU-games have empty cores is caused by the possibility of implicit utility transfers between periods. In order to capture this idea we will present another existence result on the classical core in which these utility transfers are formalized in a specific sense. Let Γ = (v, u) be a dynamic TU-game. For every nonempty coalition S and every α ∈ R define
Note that V α u (S) does not depend on v, but it does depend on u. It consists of the set of those utility allocations that can be obtained by distributing the amount α among the players in S. Let α(v(S) ) be the minimal value of α for which
For possible reference we state the following observation as a theorem. In this theorem we define an NTU-gameṼ such that for the grand coalition the individually rational part of the feasible set is contained in that of V Γ , and for each smaller coalition the feasible set contains that of V Γ . This is done in a tight way by distributing fixed amounts among the coalitions. These fixed amounts are at most equal to what each coalition could generate if it had the possibility to pool its worth over all time periods. Thus, it tries to capture the idea of transfers between periods.
e These utility functions satisfy all of our assumptions only for positive allocations, which are the only ones that are relevant in this example. Alternatively, one may take for instance utility func-
i , which satisfy all of our assumptions for all possible allocations but are slightly less easy to work with.
Proof. By definition,Ṽ (S) =
. From this the theorem follows.
For this result to be useful one has to know when the NTU-gameṼ has a nonempty core. More generally, let Γ = (w, u) be a 'trivial' dynamic game, i.e., T = 1. Then the assumption of strictly increasing utility functions implies C(Γ ) = C(w). 
The Weak and the Strong Sequential Core
First, definitions of core concepts will be proposed that capture the time structure of a dynamic game. An alternative description of one of these, the weak sequential core, is provided by Lemma 1. Theorem 4 provides an existence result for the weak sequential core in the case of two players. In Sec. 4.2 relationships between the three core concepts or the absence thereof are illustrated by examples. The last two sections are devoted to special cases where preferences are linear and symmetric, or lexicographic, respectively.
Definitions
Since every utility function u i is assumed to be time separable, there is a utility function u 
Note that by defining a deviation in this way we implicitly assume that once a coalition deviates, it deviates for the rest of the time.
Definition 2. The strong sequential core of Γ = (v, u) is the set of feasible allocation streams x for the grand coalition from which no coalition ever has a deviation.
Remark 1.
Note that x is in the strong sequential core of Γ = (v, u) if, and only if, at every stage t, the continuation stream
Therefore, the existence of a strong sequential core allocation implies the nonemptiness of all these classical cores.
We denote the strong sequential core by SSC(Γ). In its definition, we allow coalition S to deviate by allocation streams y t which, themselves, can be improved upon in the future by subcoalitions of S. The following definitions lead to a weakening of this core concept by putting an additional requirement on deviations.
Definition 3. A deviation y
t as in Definition 1 is credible if there is no S ⊆ S and time t ≥ t such that S has a deviation at t from y t , i.e., a feasible allocation stream y t , . . . , y T for S with u
Definition 4. The weak sequential core of Γ = (v, u) is the set of feasible allocation streams x for the grand coalition from which no coalition ever has a credible deviation.
We denote the weak sequential core by W SC(Γ). Obviously, the strong sequential core is always a subset of the weak sequential core. One might argue that the definition of the weak sequential core is too restrictive, since it would be natural to require a deviation by a coalition S as in Definition 3 to be credible at its turn. It is easy to show, however, that existence of a deviation by S implies the existence of a credible deviation. For suppose that S at t has a deviation y t from y t that is not credible. We may assume that S itself does not have a deviation from this deviation (otherwise continue with a deviation from which S itself does not have a deviation). Then there is a coalition S ⊂ S that has at time t ≥ t a deviation y t from y t . If this deviation is credible then it is obviously also a credible deviation from x. Otherwise we can repeat the argument, possibly until we end up at one-person coalitions, which always have a credible deviation if they have a deviation. Thus, for the weak sequential core it does not make a difference if we would add this additional requirement.
f
The weak sequential core can be characterized in a simple way. For a TU-game (N, v) and a coalition S ⊆ N the restriction of v to S is denoted by (S, v) . For a dynamic game v the notation (S, v) similarly denotes the restriction of the game to S at every moment t. Lemma 1. Let v be a dynamic game, and x a feasible allocation stream for N . Then the following two statements are equivalent.
and there is no S ⊆ N and allocation stream
Proof. For the implication (a) ⇒ (b) we only still have to show that if an allocation stream (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y T ) as in (b) would exist, then there would also exist a credible deviation, thus contradicting (a). But this is obvious because if (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y T ) is itself not credible, then we can always find another credible deviation at t = 1, by an argument analogous to the one following Definition 4. For the implication (b) ⇒ (a) we similarly only have to show that there is no credible deviation at t = 1, but this is immediate.
Note that this lemma clarifies the essentially recursive nature of the weak sequential core. This will be seen again in the examples that follow below. First we provide an existence result for the weak sequential core in the case of two players. For this result we use the following observation.
Lemma 2. Let (v, u) 
Proof. Follows directly from the time separability and monotonicity of the utility functions. Proof. For every t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, let IR(v t ) be the set of those allocation streams x t in v t that are feasible for the grand coalition and for which u
} be the set of feasible allocations for the grand coalition at stage t. For every set A of allocation streams in v t , let P O(A) be the set of Pareto optimal allocation streams in A. By Lemma 1, it may be verified easily that
for all t < T . We show by induction on t that W SC(v t ) is nonempty and compact for all t.
By assumption, C(v T ) is nonempty. Since C(v T ) is also compact, we have that W SC(v T ) is nonempty and compact. Now, let t < T, and assume that W SC (v t+1 ) is nonempty and compact. By continuity of the utility functions, we know that IR(v t ) and P O(X t ×W SC(v t+1 )) are both compact, and hence it remains to show that
. This completes the proof.
Example 5 below shows that Theorem 4 does not hold for more than two players.
Examples
From the definition, it is clear that the strong sequential core is always contained in the classical core. Moreover, the strong sequential core is always a subset of the weak sequential core, since the former allows for a more general class of deviations and is therefore more restrictive. Between the weak sequential core and the classical core, there is no logical relationship. It is even possible for both sets to be non-empty but disjoint, as is illustrated by the following example.
Example 4. Let N = {1, 2} and T = 2. Let the stage games be given by Let the utility functions be
for both i. This dynamic game can be represented by an Edgeworth box, in which the axes correspond with the two stages t = 1, 2 and at each stage, a total amount of 10 is distributed between the two agents (Fig. 1) . Although in principle allocations with negative amounts are allowed these do not play a role here. = (2, 8), since otherwise, either coalition {1} or coalition {2} could credibly deviate at the last stage. But then, also x respectively, which is better than (x 1 1 , 2) obtained in x. Hence, the only candidate for a weak sequential core allocation is ((8, 2), (2, 8) ).
We show that x = ((8, 2), (2, 8) ) is indeed in the weak sequential core. It is clear that there is no credible deviation at the last stage. Suppose that there would be a credible deviation at the first stage. Since players 1 and 2 on their own can never improve upon x, the only possibility remaining is that {1, 2} could credibly deviate at stage 1. Let y = (y In particular, the classical core and the weak sequential core are both nonempty, but have an empty intersection.
Strong sequential core. Since the strong sequential core is contained in both the classical core and the sequential core, the strong sequential core is empty.
Example 5. For the classical core we have seen that, if the stage games all have a nonempty core and the utility functions are nicely behaved, then the classical core of the dynamic TU-game is nonempty. In this example we show that this result is no longer true for the weak sequential core (and therefore neither for the strong sequential core). Let N = {1, 2, 3} and let T = 2. Let the stage games be given by
Let the utility functions be given by
Hence, both stage games have a nonempty core and Theorem 2 applies. We show, however, that the weak sequential core is empty.
Suppose that x = (x 1 , x 2 ) would be a weak sequential core element. Then, x 2 = (1, 1, 1), since otherwise some two-person coalition would obtain less than 2, and this coalition could then credibly deviate at the last stage. But then, necessarily, x 1 = (1, 1, 1), since otherwise, some two-person coalition would obtain less than 2 at the first stage, and this coalition could then credibly deviate at stage 1. However, {1, 3} can credibly deviate from ((1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1) ) at stage 1 by choosing a Pareto optimal allocation (y 1), (1, 1) ). Hence, the weak sequential core is empty.
Symmetric linear preferences
In this subsection, the preferences are assumed to be symmetric and linear. Specifically, every player i attaches utility x 
For a dynamic game v and t = 2, . . . , T define
The following lemma characterizes the weak sequential core of a game v. 
The following theorem presents a description of the strong sequential core. The simple (see Remark 1) proof is omitted. 
Lexicographic preferences
In this subsection for simplicity we confine ourselves to the case T = 2 and we assume that the players have lexicographic preferences. More precisely, we assume that every player i either prefers the first or the second period. If he prefers the first period then he prefers (
i . The preference of a player i who prefers the second period is defined similarly, with the roles of the two periods reversed. These preferences are not even representable by utility functions but nevertheless the definitions of classical and strong and weak sequential cores should be obvious.
We assume in this subsection that only nonnegative allocations are possible. Without this assumption (or at least an assumption that allocations are bounded from below) the classical core would be empty if both types of players are present: in period one we can have unlimited transfers from players who prefer period two to players who prefer period one, provided we have the reverse transfers in period two. Hence, any allocation can be blocked by a better one. By a similar argument it might also be the case that the number of credible deviations is reduced but, in general, the consequences of allowing unbounded allocations for the weak sequential core are less clear.
Assume that (v 1 , v 2 ) is a two-period dynamic TU-game with lexicographic preferences. For every coalition S write S = S 1 ∪ S 2 where S i consists of those players who prefer period i. Let (x 1 , x 2 ) be a feasible allocation stream for the grand coalition N . Then we have: Theorem 7. The following two statements are equivalent: 1 (S 1 ) < v 1 (S) for some S then any improvement for S 1 must distribute at least x 1 (S 1 ) in v 1 among the players of S 1 , but then in any element in C (S, v 2 ), by the implication in (b) at least one player in S 2 must be worse off.
The classical core of the two-stage game with lexicographic preferences is characterized in the following theorem. The proof is left to the reader. As usual (see Remark 1) the strong sequential core is the subset of the (classical) core consisting of those (x 1 , x 2 ) with x 2 ∈ C(v 2 ). This part is concluded with a simple example. From this (or directly) it follows that the strong sequential core of this game is empty.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have proposed three core concepts for dynamic cooperative finite horizon games, where at each moment a transferable utility game is played. For the strong and weak sequential cores of such games the emphasis was on the definitions and examples as well as special cases, since it is not obvious whether general and useful existence results can be derived. One interesting avenue for continued research is the application of, in particular, the weak sequential core concept to other models. Gale (1978, footnote 9) , for example, hints at such an application without further exploring the subject.
The appropriateness of a particular core concept for a dynamic cooperative game depends on the nature of the contracts that can be written in that particular situation. Roughly, the classical core is appropriate in a situation where at the beginning of the game a complete contract on the allocation stream is possible. In a world of less complete contract possibilities other concepts such as the sequential cores may be more appropriate.
This paper is part of a more general research project that aims at developing solution concepts for dynamic cooperative games. Other work may concentrate on value-like solutions, such as the Shapley value. A further interesting avenue in this project deals with the situation where the stage cooperative game depends on the history of play, as studied in Filar and Petrosjan (2000) . These topics will be the subject of future research.
